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ATWATER V. NFLPA: CASTING DOUBT ON THE EFFECT OF
EXCULPATORY LANGUAGE IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
National Football League (“NFL”) players are notoriously poor
at managing their money.1 The National Football League Players
Association (“NFLPA”) realized this, and in doing so, became the
first union to recognize the need for career planning and stronger
retirement planning for football players.2 In response, the NFLPA
enacted the Career Planning Program under the 1993 Collective
Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between the NFLPA and the NFL.3
Collective bargaining agreements create a legal relationship between employers, employees, and labor unions in which each party
has certain contractual obligations to the other parties involved in
the agreement.4 In order to limit the amount of liability a party
may incur in the event of a breach of a contractual obligation owed
to another party under a collective bargaining agreement, parties
often insert exculpatory clauses and language into the agreement.5
Exculpatory language was included in the drafting of the Career Planning Program in order to insulate the NFLPA and the
NFL from any failed investment decisions made by professional
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1. See BROKE (Rakontur 2012) (documenting various poor financial decisions
by professional athletes); see also Joe Kristan, Ex-Linebacker Romanowski Calls an Audible. Bad Call., Roth & Company, P.C. (Feb. 21, 2012, 9:54 AM), http://rothcpa.
com/2013/02/ex-linebacker-romanowski-calls-an-audible-bad-call/ (discussing recent poor investment decision by ex-football player Bill Romanowski).
2. See Geoffrey Rapp, Players Sue NFLPA over Failed Hedge Fund Investment,
SPORTS LAW BLOG (Jun. 18, 2006, 8:55 AM), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2006/
06/players-sue-nflpa-over-failed-hedge.html (“The NFLPA was the first union to
recognize that many players and retired players were making incredibly poor investment decisions, dooming themselves to a life of post-retirement financial insecurity.”); see also NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, art. LV §12 (Jan. 6, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 CBA] (“The parties will use
best efforts to establish an in-depth, comprehensive Career Planning Program.”).
3. See Rapp, supra note 2 (discussing background of Career Planning
Program).
4. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 280 (8th ed. 2004) (“[A collective bargaining
agreement is a] contract between an employer and a labor union regulating employment conditions, wages, benefits, and grievances.”).
5. See id. at 608 (“[An exculpatory clause is a] contractual provision relieving a
party for liability resulting from a negligent or wrongful act.”).
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football players.6 However, a recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has cast doubt on the effectiveness of the exculpatory language of the 1993 CBA, as well as the exculpatory
language in other collective bargaining agreements.7
This Casenote will begin by articulating the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals’ holding in Atwater v. National Football League Players Association. Next, this Casenote will provide a background of the
statutes and legal precedent that are involved in Atwater. Additionally, this Casenote will analyze and discuss the impacts of the Atwater
litigation. Lastly, this Casenote will analyze the potential impacts of
the Atwater holding, including whether the court’s holding has rendered the use of exculpatory language in collective bargaining
agreements invalid. While the Atwater litigation was limited to professional athletes, their union, and professional sports leagues, the
holding of Atwater may have far reaching effects on the use of exculpatory language in any collective bargaining agreement between an
employer and a union in any field of employment.
II. FAILED INVESTMENTS LEAD TO LAWSUIT AGAINST NFL
AND NFLPA

34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 71 Side B

The 1993 CBA between the NFL and the NFLPA established
the Career Planning Program for retired NFL Players.8 The proffered goal of the Career Planning Program was “to help players enhance their career in the NFL and make a smooth transition to a
second career.”9 Further, the Career Planning Program also provided “information to players on handling their personal finances,
it being understood that players [were] solely responsible for their
personal finances.”10

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol21/iss1/6

2

03/14/2014 13:49:04

6. See 1993 CBA, supra note 2, at art. LV § 12 (“The program will also provide
information to players on handling their personal finances, it being understood
that players shall be solely responsible for their personal finances.”).
7. See Atwater v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170, 1185
(11th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by section 301 of
Labor Management Relations Act); see also Michael Lydakis & Andrew Zapata,
Tackling the Issues: The History of the National Football League’s 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement and What it Means for the Future of the Sport, 10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J.
17, 18 (2012) (“Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit has failed to concretely establish the effect of the exculpatory language in the Career Planning Program and
the Financial Advisors Program.”).
8. See 1993 CBA, supra note 2, at art. LV § 12 (“The parties will use best efforts
to establish an in-depth, comprehensive Career Planning Program.”); see also
Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 25 (discussing implementation of Career Planning Program).
9. 1993 CBA, supra note 2, at art. LV § 12 (quoting 1993 CBA).
10. Id. (quoting further purposes of Career Planning Program).
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In 2002, The NFLPA created the Financial Advisors Program.11
The Financial Advisors Program was formed in an effort to comply
with the NFLPA’s obligation under the 1993 CBA to create a comprehensive Career Planning Program.12 The Financial Advisors
Program is available to any due-paying member of the NFLPA.13
Under the Financial Advisors Program, NFLPA members are provided a list of financial advisors that have been registered with the
NFLPA and have undergone a background check by the NFLPA.14
Before implementing the Financial Advisors Program, the
NFLPA worked with and received assistance from the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in order to ensure that the program
was exempt from coverage under the Investment Advisors Act of
1940.15 Based on recommendations from the SEC, the NFLPA
chose not to use “‘highly selective’ screening criteria” to make sure
that the NFLPA was not required to register as an investment advisor with the SEC.16
As a result, the NFLPA was required to open its Financial Advisors Program to as many investment advisors as possible.17 Accordingly, “[the NFLPA] only denied advisor applications if a
background check revealed certain enumerated actions against the
advisor.”18 In total, the Financial Advisor Program listed about 500
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11. See Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing NFLPA Financial Advisors Program).
12. See id. (noting reasons for establishment of Financial Advisors Program).
13. See id. (stating qualifications for Financial Advisors Program).
14. See id. (discussing how Financial Advisors Program works).
15. See Atwater v. Nat’l Football League Player’s Ass’n, No. 1:06-CV-1510-JEC,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *4-5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2009) (discussing background of NFLPA’s Financial Advisor Program); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra
note 7, at 26 (providing background of Financial Advisor Program). The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 was created in an effort to monitor and regulate individuals that provide investment advice to others by requiring them to register with the
SEC. See Investment Advisors Act of 1940, REFERENCEFORBUSINESS.COM, http://www.
referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Int-Jun/Investment-Advisers-Act-of-1940.
html#ixzz1dfQ4ZQXJ (last visited Dec. 26, 2013) (“Generally excluded from coverage under the act are those professionals whose investment advice to clients is
incidental to the professional relationship.”).
16. See Atwater, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *5 (discussing establishment
of Financial Advisor Program).
17. See id. (noting that in order to comply with SEC Regulations, Financial
Advisor Program had to be open to as many investment advisors as possible); see
also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (providing background information on
Financial Advisors Program).
18. Atwater, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *5 (citing NFLPA REGULATIONS
AND CODE OF CONDUCT GOVERNING REGISTERED PLAYER FINANCIAL ADVISORS (“PROGRAM REGULATIONS”) 180, at 198-200).
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financial advisors with whom former and current football players
could invest.19
The NFLPA’s Financial Advisor Program was subject to litigation in Atwater v. National Football League Players Association.20 In
Atwater, several former NFL players, a player’s spouse, and several
investment entities and trusts controlled by the former players
brought suit against the NFL and the NFLPA.21 In 2004 and 2005,
the plaintiffs invested approximately $20 million with financial advisors Kirk Wright and Nelson “Keith” Bond.22 Wright and Bond, as
well as other financial advisors, operated an investment company
known as International Management Associates (“IMA”).23 While
Plaintiffs believed that IMA was investing and managing their
money, Wright was actually conducting a Ponzi scheme.24 Through
the Ponzi scheme, Wright stole most of the money the plaintiffs
invested with him.25 Eventually, IMA sought bankruptcy relief and

4
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19. See id. (noting number of financial advisors registered under NFLPA Financial Advisors Program).
20. See Atwater v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir.
2010) (holding that plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by Labor Management Relations Act).
21. See id. (providing facts of litigation); see also James Ottavio Castagnera,
NFL Players, Victimized by Ponzi Scheme, Cannot Sue Their Union or the NFL Under State
Laws, 41 NO. 5 LAW. BRIEF 4, 4 (2011) (discussing facts of Atwater); see also Lydakis
& Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (providing background information of Atwater).
22. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1174 (providing facts behind plaintiffs’ claims); see
also Atwater, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *5 (noting that Plaintiffs’ invested
millions of dollars under Financial Advisors Program); see also Castagnera, supra
note 21, at 4 (detailing facts leading to Atwater litigation); see also Lydakis & Zapata,
supra note 7, at 26 (discussing facts of Atwater).
23. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1174 (providing background information on financial advisors with which plaintiffs invested money); see also Atwater, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 98236, at *5 (summarizing facts leading up to Ponzi Scheme); Castagnera,
supra note 21, at 4 (discussing facts leading to Atwater litigation); Lydakis & Zapata,
supra note 7, at 26 (noting amount of money invested by plaintiffs under Financial
Advisors Program).
24. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1174 (providing facts behind Atwater); see also
Atwater, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *5 (discussing facts of case); Lydakis &
Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (noting facts of Atwater). A Ponzi scheme is defined as
“[a] fraudulent investing scam promising high rates of return with little risk to
investors. The Ponzi scheme generates returns for older investors by acquiring
new investors.” See Ponzi Scheme, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.
com/terms/p/ponzischeme.asp#axzz2NqMFXIBn (last visited Mar. 17, 2013) (defining Ponzi Scheme).
25. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1174 (discussing Ponzi Scheme conducted by
Wright and Bond); see also Atwater, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *5 (noting that
plaintiffs’ lost most of their investment as result of Ponzi Scheme); see also Lydakis
& Zapata, supra note 6, at 26 (discussing Atwater).
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Wright was convicted on several felony charges.26 Before his sentencing hearing, Wright committed suicide in his jail cell.27
Subsequently, the plaintiffs brought suit against the NFL and
the NFLPA alleging that they would not have invested money with
Wright, Bond, and IMA had the financial advisors been properly
investigated by the NFLPA.28 The plaintiffs further alleged that the
NFL provided them with inadequate background checks on Wright,
Bond, and IMA.29 In total, the plaintiffs brought three claims
against the NFL and the NFLPA.30 The District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia held that section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) preempted the plaintiffs’
claims.31 Thereafter, the claims were appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit.32

5
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26. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1174 (discussing facts of case); Atwater, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *5 (noting that IMA filed for bankruptcy); see also Lydakis &
Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing facts of Atwater).
27. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1174 (providing facts behind plaintiffs’ claims); see
also Ashley Post, Labor Contract Blocks NFL Players’ Lawsuit, INSIDECOUNSEL (Feb. 1,
2011, 9:45 AM), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/02/01/labor-contractblocks-nfl-players-lawsuit (noting that Wright hung himself in his jail cell); see also
Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (acknowledging that Wright committed suicide in jail).
28. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1174 (discussing plaintiffs’ claims against NFLPA
and NFL); see also Castagnera, supra note 21, at 4 (noting that plaintiffs’ would not
have invested money with Wright and Bond had NFL and NFLPA provided accurate information regarding financial advisors).
29. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1174 (“As for the NFL, Plaintiffs asserted that several Plaintiffs requested, and the NFL provided, background checks on Wright,
Bond, and IMA that were inadequate.”); see also Castagnera, supra note 21, at 4
(noting plaintiffs’ complaint against NFL); Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26
(discussing plaintiffs’ complaint).
30. See generally Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1179-84 (concluding that all three of
plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by section 301 of Labor Management Relations
Act); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (“The plaintiffs sued the NFL
and NFLPA on state law claims of negligence, negligent mispresentation, and
breach of fiduciary duty.”).
31. See Atwater v. Nat’l Football League Player’s Ass’n, No. 1:06-CV-1510-JEC,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *4-5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2009) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (“The District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia held that the Labor-Management Relations Act
(‘LMRA’) preempted state law claims as to failed investments under the Career
Planning Program. Furthermore, the District Court held that even if the state law
claims were not precluded under the LMRA, the exculpatory language of the Financial Advisors Program would have prevented the NFL and NFLPA from incurring liability.”); Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 § 301, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (2012) (providing federal courts authority in labor disputes based on
collective bargaining agreements).
32. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1175 (“Plaintiffs appeal from that decision.”); see
also Castagnera, supra note 21, at 4 (“The federal district court granted summary
judgment with regard to the plaintiffs’ causes of action. The U.S. Court of Appeals
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First, the plaintiffs brought a negligence claim against the
NFLPA.33 The plaintiffs alleged that the NFLPA was negligent in
their investigation of Wright, Bond, and IMA while conducting
their background check on the individuals and their investment
company.34 Under Georgia law, a plaintiff must show the following
elements in order to state a cause of action for negligence:
(1) A legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct
raised by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm; (2) a breach of this standard; (3)
a legally attributable causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) some loss or damage
flowing to the plaintiff’s legally protected interest as a result of the alleged breach of the legal duty.35
The appellate court concluded that the defendants did owe
the plaintiffs a duty because the CBA between the NFL and the
NFLPA established a legal duty when it mandated that the NFL and
NFLPA use their best efforts to establish a Career Planning Program.36 However, the appellate court held that section 301 of the
LMRA preempted the plaintiffs’ negligence claim because the legal
duties underlying the negligence claim arose directly from the
CBA.37
The plaintiffs’ second claim against the NFL and the NFLPA
was for negligent misrepresentation.38 The plaintiffs alleged that
the NFL negligently provided false information about Wright,
Bond, and IMA.39 Under Georgia law, a plaintiff must prove three
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 73 Side B
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for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.”); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26
(noting that plaintiffs appealed to Eleventh Circuit).
33. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1179 (“Plaintiffs’ first state-law claim alleged that
both Defendants negligently investigated Wright, Bond and IMA.”).
34. See id. (discussing plaintiffs’ first complaint); see also Castagnera, supra
note 21, at 4 (discussing plaintiffs’ allegations against NFLPA and NFL).
35. Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Dixie Grp., Inc. v. Shaw Indus. Grp.,
Inc., 693 S.E.2d 888, 895 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)); see also Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner,
296 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Ga. 1982) (discussing elements of negligence under Georgia
law).
36. Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1179 (quoting 1993 CBA). For complete language of
art. LV § 12 of the 1993 CBA, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
37. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1180-81 (holding that district court properly held
that section 301 of LMRA preempted plaintiffs’ negligence claim); see also Lydakis
& Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (analyzing court’s holding in Atwater).
38. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1182 (“Plaintiffs’ second claim against both the
NFL and the NFLPA was one for negligent misrepresentation; these claims may be
considered together.”).
39. See id. (analyzing plaintiffs’ allegations); see also Castagnera, supra note 21,
at 4 (discussing plaintiffs’ allegations against NFLPA and NFL).
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elements to establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation.40
First, a plaintiff must show that the defendant negligently supplied
false information.41 Second, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he
reasonably relied upon the false information.42 Third, a plaintiff
must show that the economic injury to the plaintiff was proximately
caused by the reliance on the false information.43
In response to the negligent misrepresentation claim, the
court found that the NFL had a duty to provide the plaintiffs with
adequate information regarding financial advisors because the CBA
established a legal duty when it mandated that the NFL should use
their best efforts to establish the Career Planning Program.44 However, the court felt that the second element of negligent misrepresentation, reasonable reliance on the false information element,
was not met in the instant case.45 The court held that the negligent
misrepresentation was preempted by section 301 because the legal
duty arose directly from the CBA.46
The plaintiffs’ final claim brought against the NFL and the
NFLPA was for breach of fiduciary duty.47 Under Georgia law, establishing a claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of
three elements.48 First, the plaintiffs must prove that a fiduciary

7
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40. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1182 (noting elements of cause of action for negligent misrepresentation under Georgia law).
41. See id. (quoting Futch v. Lowndes Cnty., 676 S.E.2d 892, 896 (Ga. Ct. App.
2009)); see also Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., 479
S.E.2d 727, 729 (Ga. 1997) (discussing elements for cause of action for negligent
mispresentation).
42. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1182 (quoting Futch v. Lowndes Cnty., 676 S.E.2d
892, 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)); see also Hardaway Co., 479 S.E.2d at 729 (noting
second element of negligent misrepresentation under Georgia law).
43. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1182 (quoting Futch v. Lowndes Cnty., 676 S.E.2d
892, 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)); see also Hardaway Co., 479 S.E.2d at 729 (noting
third element of negligent misrepresentation under Georgia law).
44. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1182-83 (“For the same reasons set forth above,
each of these duties arose directly from the CBA’s mandate that both the NFL and
the NFLPA use ‘best efforts to establish [the] Career Planning program.’ ”); see also
Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (analyzing court’s holding).
45. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1183 (“That is because, under Georgia law, ‘the
mere presence of [a] disclaimer,’ regardless of whether or not the plaintiffs saw it,
can ‘render [the plaintiffs’] alleged reliance unreasonable.’ ”); see also Mitchell v.
Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 593 S.E.2d 903, 907 (Ga. App. 2004) (noting that determining reasonable reliance depends on all circumstances of case).
46. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1183 (holding plaintiffs’ negligent mispresentation
claim preempted by section 301 of LMRA); see also Castagnera, supra note 21, at 4
(discussing court’s holding); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (analyzing court’s holding).
47. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1183 (“Plaintiffs’ third state-law claim alleged that
both Defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs.”).
48. See id. (quoting Paschal v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Auth. Emp. Ret. Plan, 699
S.E.2d 357, 362 (Ga. App. 2010)).
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duty exists.49 Second, plaintiffs must show that the duty was
breached.50 Third, plaintiffs must show that the damage resulting
to the plaintiff was proximately caused by the breach of the fiduciary duty.51
The court first analyzed whether a fiduciary duty was created
by the CBA.52 Plaintiffs alleged that the CBA established a fiduciary
duty between the NFL, the NFLPA, and the plaintiffs because the
defendants should have known that the plaintiffs had great confidence in the defendants and therefore the defendants were in a
position where they could influence the plaintiffs’ conduct.53 The
appellate court agreed that a fiduciary duty existed.54 However, because the resolution of the fiduciary duty claim was substantially dependent on the interpretation of the CBA, section 301 of the LMRA
preempted the state law claim.55
Lastly, several of the plaintiffs attempted to argue that since
they were retired at the time they invested with IMA, section 301 of
the LMRA could not preempt their claims because the retired
plaintiffs were no longer members of the NFLPA’s bargaining
unit.56 The court disagreed and ultimately granted summary judgment to the NFL and the NFLPA because section 301 of the LMRA
preempts their claims of negligence, negligent misrepresentation,
and breach of fiduciary duty.57
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49. See id. (quoting Paschal v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Auth. Emp. Ret. Plan, 699
S.E.2d 357, 362 (Ga. App. 2010)).
50. See id. (quoting Paschal v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Auth. Emp. Ret. Plan, 699
S.E.2d 357, 362 (Ga. App. 2010)).
51. See id. (quoting Paschal v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Auth. Emp. Ret. Plan, 699
S.E.2d 357, 362 (Ga. App. 2010)).
52. See id. at 1183-84 (discussing plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim).
53. See id. at 1184 (“In support of this claim, Plaintiffs alleged only that ‘Defendants have maintained a close and special relationship with each of the Plaintiffs such that Defendants were in a position to, and did, exercise a controlling
influence over the will, conduct, and/or interest of Plaintiffs.’ ”).
54. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1184 (discussing breach of fiduciary duty
complaint).
55. See id. (holding breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by § 301 of
LMRA).
56. See id. (addressing plaintiffs’ final argument in regards to retired
plaintiffs).
57. See id. at 1185 (dismissing plaintiffs’ argument that § 301 of LMRA should
not preempt claims of retired plaintiffs); see also id. (“For these reasons, we uphold
the district court’s determination that § 301 preempts Plaintiffs’ state-law claims.
We, therefore, affirm the district court’s decision granting the NFL and NFLPA
summary judgment on those claims.”); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at
26-7 (discussing court’s holding).
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PREEMPTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING DISPUTES UNDER
SECTION 301 OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT

The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) was passed by
Congress in 1935.58 The purpose of the NLRA is:
[T]o promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the
legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their
relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and
peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the
rights of individual employees in their relations with labor
organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define
and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in
connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.59
The NLRA allows and encourages the use of collective bargaining
to protect the rights of employers and employees.60 The formation
of labor unions and collective bargaining enables employees to negotiate for rights and benefits that they would be unlikely to receive
if they were negotiating for themselves.61 Through the use of collective bargaining agreements, employers and employees represented by unions are able to agree on a number of workplace
conditions including, but not limited to, hours worked and benefits.62 The first CBA between the NFL and the NFLPA was signed in
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58. See John E. Gardner, Editorial Note, Federal Labor Law Preemption of State
Wrongful Discharge Claims, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 491, 491 (1989) (introducing American labor law); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 17 (providing background
information on history of labor relations).
59. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 1(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141
(2006) (noting purpose of NLRA, as amended by Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947).
60. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/national-labor-relations-act (“Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (‘NLRA’) in 1935 to protect the rights of employees
and employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain private
sector labor and management practices, which can harm the general welfare of
workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”).
61. See Gardner, supra note 58, at 491 (discussing NLRA of 1935).
62. See Rebecca Hanner White, Section 301’s Preemption of State Law Claims: A
Model for Analysis, 41 ALA. L. REV. 377, 377 (1990) (introducing uses and helpfulness of collective bargaining agreements between employers and employees); see
also Gardner, supra note 57, at 500 (“The typical collective bargaining agreements
contains provisions dealing with pay rate, seniority, benefits, management
promises to maintain a safe work place, and ‘just cause’ limitations on reasons for
employee dismissal.”).
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1968.63 Since then, new collective bargaining agreements have
been signed numerous times, with the most recent CBA being
signed in the summer of 2011.64
Congress amended the NLRA by enacting the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947.65 The Labor Management Relations
Act (“LMRA”), more popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, is a
federal law that regulates the actions and collective bargaining of
labor unions.66 While the NLRA was directed at curbing unfair labor practices of employers, the LMRA largely targets unfair labor
practices by employees.67 Section 301 of the LMRA states that lawsuits for breach of contract between labor unions and employers
may be brought in any federal district court.68 Facially, section 301
only grants federal courts the permission to hear claims based on
breaches of collective bargaining agreements.69 However, the Supreme Court determined that section 301 does more than just allow
federal courts to hear breach of collective bargaining agreement
claims.70
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63. See Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 18 (discussing first CBA in NFL
history); see also Jarrett Bell, Timeline of NFL Labor Disputes, USA TODAY (Mar. 12,
2011, 12:36 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2011-0303-nfl-labor-disputes-timeline_N.htm (providing timeline of NFL labor disputes).
64. See generally Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 18-20 (discussing history of
NFL labor relations); see also Bell, supra note 63 (giving timeline of NFL labor
disputes).
65. See Gardner, supra note 58, at 495-96 (“Furthermore, when Congress
amended the NLRA by enacting the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA) in
1947, it declared its preference for grievance procedures and arbitration dispute
resolution to be an express and integral part of the national labor relations policy
it was attempting to institute.”).
66. See Labor-Management Relations Act, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Labor-Management+Relations+Act (last visited
Dec. 26, 2013) (defining Labor-Management Relations Act); see also 51B C.J.S. Labor Relations § 994 (2013) (discussing Labor-Management Relations Act).
67. See Gardner, supra note 58, at 495-96 (discussing NLRA of 1935).
68. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (2006) (granting federal courts authority to hear disputes for contract
violations between employers and labor unions).
69. See id. (“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”);
see also Laura W. Stein, Preserving Unionized Employees’ Individual Employment Rights:
An Argument Against Section 301 Preemption, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 5
(1996) (“On its face, section 301 of the LMRA simply gives the federal courts jurisdiction over suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements.”).
70. See Stein, supra note 69, at 5 (“The Supreme Court, however, quickly held
that section 301 is more than a bare jurisdictional grant. Instead, the court read it
as a mandate for the federal courts to develop a federal common law of labor
contracts to apply in suits brought to enforce collective bargaining agreements.”).
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In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court
held that section 301 of the LMRA “authorize[d] federal courts to
fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective
bargaining agreements . . . .”71 In Textile Workers Union, the plaintiff
and the defendant were parties to a collective bargaining agreement that contained a grievance and arbitration procedure.72 The
employer refused to undergo arbitration and the union brought
suit against the employer under section 301.73 The Supreme Court
sided with the union and held that section 301 authorized federal
courts to order specific performance of arbitration clauses in a collective bargaining agreement.74
In reaching its holding, the Court focused on the congressional intent behind section 301 of the LMRA.75 The Court concluded that the congressional intent of the law was “obtaining
industrial peace.”76 Consequently, the Court held that the substantive law that is to be applied when section 301 is invoked is “federal
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national
labor laws.”77 As stated by one scholar, “[t]o read section 301 as a
grant of jurisdiction only would deprive the federal courts of the
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71. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,
451 (1957) (holding that LMRA “authorizes federal courts to fashion body of federal common law for enforcement of collective bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law specific performance of promises to arbitrate
grievances under collective bargaining agreements”); see also Gardner, supra note
58, at 496 (discussing Textile Workers Union); White, supra note 62, at 379-80 (quoting Textile Workers Union); Geri J. Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remedies in the
Aftermath of Lingle v. Norge: Wholly Independent or Inextricably Intertwined?, 34 S.D. L.
REV. 63, 79 (1989) (stating holding of Textile Workers Union).
72. See Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 449 (introducing facts of case); see also
White, supra note 62, at 380 (“The employer and union were parties to a collective
bargaining agreement that contained a grievance and arbitration procedure.”).
73. See Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 449 (discussing facts of case); see also
White, supra note 62, at 380 (introducing facts behind Textile Workers Union).
74. See Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 451 (“[The Court’s] construction of
[§] 301(a), which means that the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes, contained in this collective bargaining agreement, should be specifically enforced.”);
see also Gardner, supra note 58, at 496 (discussing holding of Textile Workers Union);
White, supra note 62, at 380 (stating Supreme Court’s holding in Textile Workers
Union).
75. See Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 452 (“The legislative history of [§] 301
is somewhat cloudy and confusing. But there are a few shafts of light that illuminate our problem.”); see also Gardner, supra note 58, at 496 (discussing holding of
Textile Workers Union); White, supra note 62, at 380 (noting Court focused on legislative history of § 301).
76. Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 455 (discussing congressional intent of
§ 301); see also White, supra note 61, at 380 (discussing holding of Textile Workers
Union).
77. Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 456 (noting which law is to be applied in
§ 301 cases).
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necessary means to enforce collective bargaining agreements, particularly the arbitration provisions.”78
In Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., the Court further emphasized
the need to apply federal law in adjudicating claims arising from
the breach of a collective bargaining agreement.79 In Teamsters, an
employer brought suit against a labor union for breach of contract
because the labor union organized a strike which violated the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement.80 The Court sided with the
employer and agreed that the labor union violated the collective
bargaining agreement by organizing the strike.81 In its holding, the
Court further emphasized the importance of having uniform federal labor law.82 In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington, which theorized that
state courts are allowed to apply local, state rules when hearing
claims arising from the breach of a collective bargaining agreement.83 The Court emphasized the importance of the Textile Workers opinion and stated, “[t]he dimensions of [section] 301 require
the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must
be paramount in the area covered by statute.”84
Furthermore, the Court stated, “[c]omprehensive is inherent
in the process by which the law is to be formulated under the mandate of [Textile Workers], requiring issues raised in suits of kind covered by [section] 301 to be decided according to the precepts of
federal labor policy.”85 According to the Court, Congress enacted
section 301 of the LMRA in order to ensure that labor law involving
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78. White, supra note 62, at 380 (discussing outcome of Textile Workers Union).
79. See generally Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)
(holding state law must be preempted in § 301 cases to ensure uniformity in interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements).
80. See id. at 97 (noting facts of case); see also White, supra note 62, at 381
(introducing facts of Teamsters).
81. See Teamsters, 369 U.S. at 106 (“The strike which it called was a violation of
that contractual agreement.”).
82. See id. (emphasizing importance of uniform federal labor law for future
adjudications).
83. See id. at 103 (“It was apparently the theory of the Washington court, that
although [Textile Workers Union] requires the federal courts to fashion, from the
policy of our national labor law, a body of federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, nonetheless, the courts of the States remain free to
apply individualized local rules when called upon to enforce such agreements.
This view cannot be accepted.”); see also Stein, supra note 69, at 5 (introducing
changes in law under § 301); White, supra note 62, at 381-82 (discussing Supreme
Court’s holding in Teamsters).
84. Teamsters, 369 U.S. at 103 (emphasizing importance of Textile Workers
Union).
85. Id. (noting importance of having common federal labor law).
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collective bargaining agreements was applied uniformly throughout
the United States, in order to avoid the unpredictable results that
could result from inconsistent local laws.86 Therefore, section 301
of the LMRA preempts breach of contract claims brought by any
party to a collective bargaining agreement.87
In 1962, the same year as the landmark Teamsters decision, the
Supreme Court broadened the purview of section 301 of the
LMRA, holding that it permits individuals, not solely unions and
employers, to bring claims for the breach of a collective bargaining
agreement.88 In Smith v. Evening News Association, the plaintiff
brought suit in state court against his employer for breaching the
collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the
plaintiff’s union.89 The plaintiff alleged that the employer
breached a provision in the collective bargaining agreement that
stated that the employer would not discriminate against any employees involved in activity with a labor union.90 Motivated by a
desire to ensure the uniformity of federal labor law, the Supreme
Court held that an individual’s claim against an employer or his
labor union falls under the scope of section 301 in order to ensure
the uniformity of federal labor law.91
While the 1960s and 1970s saw few challenges to section 301
preemption of breach of collective bargaining claims, the 1980s
proved to be different.92 During the 1960s and 1970s, breach of
collective bargaining agreement dispute resolution was quick and
inexpensive for two reasons: section 301 preempted many of the
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86. See id. at 104 (“With due regard to the many factors which bear upon
competing state and federal interests in this area [ ] we cannot but conclude that
in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to
prevail over inconsistent local rules.”); see also Gardner, supra note 58, at 502 (discussing congressional intent behind § 301).
87. See White, supra note 62, at 381-82 (discussing impact of Teamsters
holding).
88. See Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (holding individual
employees may bring cause of action against labor union or employer under
§ 301); see also White, supra note 62, at 382 (discussing development of law surrounding § 301).
89. See Smith, 371 U.S. at 195-96 (stating facts of case).
90. See id. (noting plaintiff’s complaint).
91. See id. at 200 (“Individual claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery, are to a large degree inevitably intertwined with union interests, and many times precipitate grave questions concerning the interpretation and
enforceability of the collective bargaining contract on which they are based. To
exclude these claims from the ambit of § 301 would stultify the congressional policy of having the administration of collective bargaining contracts accomplished
under a uniform body of federal substantive law. This we are unwilling to do.”).
92. See White, supra note 62, at 390 (discussing evolution of preemption
under § 301).
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claims; and section 301 showed deference to the use of arbitration
to resolve disputes.93 However, by the 1980s, labor relations between employers and employees “were marked by the rapid erosion
of the employment-at-will doctrine.”94 As such, state courts began
to hear claims for wrongful discharge brought by an employee
against his or her employer.95 Furthermore, rather than pleading a
cause of action for the breach of a collective bargaining agreement,
plaintiffs began to plead state law tort claims against their employers as a gambit to avoid preemption by section 301.96
In the landmark case Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, the Supreme
Court held that a state law tort action that is “inextricably intertwined” with a collective bargaining agreement must be treated as a
section 301 suit or be preempted by federal law.97 In Lueck, the
plaintiff suffered an injury that was not related to his work with the
employer.98 Under the collective bargaining agreement covering
the plaintiff’s employment, the plaintiff was entitled to collect disability insurance.99 The plaintiff believed that his employer had ordered his payments to be discontinued and repeatedly made him
undergo physical examinations.100 Therefore, the plaintiff brought
suit against his employer for the bad faith handling of an insurance
claim.101
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93. See id. (“Employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement had at
their disposal a grievance and arbitration procedure for resolving their disputes,
which presented a quick and inexpensive method for handling disagreements.”).
94. Id. (introducing evolution of labor relations in 1980s).
95. See id. at 390-91 (discussing emergence of state law wrongful discharge
claims and their impact on labor relations).
96. See id. at 391 (“Employees, moreover, began making more liberal use of
traditional tort theories for actions arising out of their employment.”).
97. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985) (holding state
law actions that are “inextricably intertwined” with collective bargaining agreement must be preempted by federal law or treated as § 301 suit).
98. See id. at 202-04 (introducing facts of case); see also Gardner, supra note 58,
at 520 (discussing facts of Lueck); White, supra note 62, at 394 (stating facts of
Lueck).
99. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 204 (discussing collective bargaining agreement covering plaintiffs employment); see also Gardner, supra note 58, at 520 (noting facts
of Lueck); White, supra note 62, at 394 (stating facts regarding plaintiff’s collective
bargaining agreement).
100. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 204 (discussing facts); see also Gardner, supra note
58, at 520 (noting facts of case).
101. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 (noting plaintiff’s allegations); see also Gardner,
supra note 58, at 520 (discussing facts of Lueck); White, supra note 62, at 394
(“Lueck claimed his employer, Allis-Chalmers, periodically had ordered that his
payments be cut off and had insisted he undergo repeated physical examinations,
conduct Lueck viewed as harassment.”).
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The Court held that the Wisconsin Supreme Court should
have dismissed the plaintiff’s case because federal labor law preempted the state law tort claim.102 Justice Blackmon, writing for
the majority, held that when the resolution of a state law tort claim
substantially relies on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the claim must be treated as a section 301 claim or it must be
dismissed as preempted by federal law.103 Furthermore, the Court
in Lueck stated that in order for a tort claim to escape preemption
by section 301, the plaintiff’s right that is being infringed upon in
the plaintiff’s claim must be a nonnegotiable right.104 Since the
collective bargaining agreement gave rise to the ability for the
plaintiff to collect disability insurance payments, the Court quickly
determined that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted by section
301.105
In Lueck, the Court had little choice but to hold that state law
tort claims that do not exist independently of a collective bargaining agreement must be treated as a section 301 suit or be dismissed
as preempted by federal labor law.106 As noted by one scholar,
“[a]ny other result would have permitted a party, as the Court recognized, to escape section 301 by relabeling the action as one for
tortious breach of contract.”107 Thus, under Lueck, “when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of
the terms of an agreement made between the parties to a labor
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102. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 (“This complaint should have been dismissed
. . . .”); see also White, supra note 62, at 394-95 (“The Wisconsin Supreme Court
held Lueck’s claim was not preempted by section 301 because the tort claim was
‘independent’ of the collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court
reversed.”).
103. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 (“We do hold that when resolution of a statelaw claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement
made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a
§ 301 claim [ ] or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.”).
104. See id. at 213 (“Therefore, state-law rights and obligations that do not
exist independently of private agreements, and that as a result can be waived or
altered by agreement of private parties, are pre-empted by those agreements. Our
analysis must focus, then, on whether the Wisconsin tort action for breach of the
duty of good faith as applied here confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract, or, instead,
whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration
of the terms of the labor contract.”); see also Michael C. Harper, Limiting Section 301
Preemption: Three Cheers for the Trilogy, Only One for Lingle and Lueck, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 685, 713-14 (analyzing holding of Lueck); White, supra note 62, at 397-98 (discussing holding of Lueck).
105. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 217-18 (analyzing whether collective bargaining
agreement gave rise to plaintiff’s rights).
106. See White, supra note 62, at 396 (analyzing holding of Lueck).
107. Id. (discussing § 301 litigation).
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contract, that claim must be either treated as a [section] 301 claim,
or be dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.”108
Two years later, in 1987, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision to preempt tort claims brought by employees against employers and unions in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.
Hechler.109 In Hechler, the Court determined that a negligence claim
brought by a plaintiff against her union must be preempted by section 301 because the claim was not “sufficiently independent of the
collective-bargaining-agreement to withstand the pre-emptive force
of [section] 301.”110
While Lueck initially stood for a “sweeping view of preemption,”
the Court later determined that not all state law tort claims are preempted by section 301 whenever a collective bargaining agreement
governs an employment relationship.111 In Lingle v. Norge Division
of Magic Chef, Inc., the Court held that a state law claim for retaliatory discharge was not preempted by section 301 of the LRMA.112
In Lingle, the plaintiff was fired by her employer because she allegedly filed a false workers’ compensation claim.113 The plaintiff
brought suit against her employer in Illinois for retaliatory discharge, a common-law cause of action.114 The case was removed to
a federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction.115
The district court dismissed the claim because the cause of action filed by the plaintiff was “inextricably intertwined” with the col-
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108. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 (holding plaintiff’s claims preempted by § 301); see
also White, supra note 62, at 398-99 (restating holding of Lueck).
109. See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987) (holding
that state law claim of negligence against plaintiff’s union was preempted by
§ 301); see also White, supra note 62, at 400-01 (introducing Hechler).
110. Hechler, 481 U.S. at 853 (determining whether plaintiff’s claim must be
preempted by § 301); see also White, supra note 62, at 401 (“Finding the claim was
not ‘sufficiently independent of the collective bargaining agreement to withstand
the pre-emptive force of § 301,’ the Supreme Court vacated the decision.”).
111. See White, supra note 62, at 415 (discussing evolution of law surrounding
§ 301).
112. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (holding state law claim for retaliatory discharge was not preempted by § 301); see also
Harper, supra note 102, at 700 (discussing § 301 preemption under Lingle and
Lueck); White, supra note 62, at 411-12 (discussing Lingle).
113. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 401 (introducing facts of case); see also White, supra
note 62, at 410-11 (stating facts of Lingle).
114. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 401 (expanding on facts of case); see also White,
supra note 62, at 410-11 (stating facts of Lingle).
115. See White, supra note 62, at 411 (“The case was removed on diversity
grounds and dismissed by the district court which concluded the retaliatory discharge action was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the contract’s just cause
provision.”).
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lective bargaining agreement.116 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.117 However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision and found that the retaliatory
discharge claim was independent from the collective bargaining
agreement because the state law claim did not require analyzing the
collective bargaining agreement in order to make a decision.118
Thus, under Lingle, in order for a state law claim to be preempted
by section 301, the state law claim must “implicate analysis of
the [collective bargaining agreement] before preemption will
occur.”119
Lastly, in Steelworkers v. Rawson, the Supreme Court held that
section 301 of the LMRA preempts a state law tort claim if the duty
underlying the tort claim is created by a collective bargaining agreement.120 In Rawson, the surviving family members of deceased
Idaho mine workers brought a claim against the miners’ union for
negligently inspecting the mine that the miners were working in
before the accident that caused their deaths.121 The Court found
that the collective bargaining agreement created the ability for the
miners’ union to inspect the mines; therefore, any duty that the
union had to inspect the mines arose from the collective bargaining
agreement.122 Thus, the Court held that section 301 preempted
the plaintiffs’ claims.123
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116. See id. (providing procedural history of case).
117. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 402 (“The Court of Appeals agreed that the statelaw claim was preempted by § 301.”); see also White, supra note 62, at 411 (stating
procedural history of case).
118. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 (“In sum, we hold that an application of state
law is pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 only if
such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.”); see also Gardner, supra note
58, at 525-26 (restating Court’s holding); see also Harper, supra note 104, at 701
(noting holding of Lingle); see also White, supra note 62, at 412 (discussing impact
of holding in Lingle).
119. White, supra note 62, at 412 (analyzing Supreme Court’s holding in
Lingle).
120. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990) (holding
§ 301 preempts state law tort claims if duty underlying tort claim is created by
collective bargaining agreement); see also Harper, supra note 104, at 731 (discussing Rawson).
121. See Rawson, 495 U.S. at 364-65 (stating facts of case); see also Harper, supra
note 104, at 731 (introducing facts of Rawson).
122. See Rawson, 495 U.S. at 370 (analyzing collective bargaining agreement
covering plaintiff’s employment); see also Harper, supra note 104, at 731 (analyzing
Rawson).
123. See Rawson, 495 U.S. at 371-72 (“Pre-emption by federal law cannot be
avoided by characterizing the Union’s negligent performance of what it does on
behalf of the members of the bargaining unit pursuant to the terms of the collective-bargaining contract as a state-law tort. Accordingly, this suit, if it is to go for-
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Reasoning and Analysis of the Court’s Holding in Atwater

34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 79 Side B

In dismissing the retired NFL players’ claims, the Atwater Court
focused almost solely on the language of section 301 of the LMRA
and the language of the collective bargaining agreement between
the NFL and the NFLPA.124 With respect to the plaintiffs’ negligence claim against the NFLPA, the court found that the CBA created a legal duty to adequately conduct background checks on any
financial advisor listed in the NFLPA Financial Advisor Program.125
Therefore, the court, relying on the principles of Lingle, held that
the claim should be preempted by section 301 since the legal duty
underlying the negligence claim arose from the CBA.126
Next, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim of negligent misrepresentation.127 While the court found that a legal duty existed,
the court held that the plaintiffs did not reasonably rely on the false
information provided by the NFL regarding Wright, Bond, and
IMA because the CBA provides that under the Career Planning Program, players alone are solely responsible for their personal finances.128 Thus, the court found that the reasonable reliance
element of a claim for negligent misrepresentation was not met because under Georgia law, “‘the mere presence of [a] disclaimer,’
regardless of whether or not the plaintiffs saw it, can ‘render [the
plaintiffs’] alleged reliance unreasonable.’”129
More importantly, the court found that the legal duty the NFL
owed the plaintiffs was created by the CBA’s mandate that the
NFLPA and the NFL use their best efforts to create a Career Planning Program for former and present NFL players.130 Additionally,
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ward at all, must proceed as a case controlled by federal, rather than state, law.”);
see also Harper, supra note 104, at 731 (stating holding of Rawson).
124. See generally Atwater v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170,
1176-85 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs’ claims were preempted by § 301
of Labor Management Relations Act); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 6, at 27
(analyzing Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Atwater).
125. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1179 (“Those duties arose directly from the CBA’s
mandate that, [t]he parties will use best efforts to establish an in depth, comprehensive Career Planning Program.”).
126. See id. at 1177-81 (finding plaintiffs’ negligence claim to be preempted
by LMRA § 301 because defendant’s legal duty arose from CBA).
127. See id. at 1183 (declaring negligent misrepresentation claim to be preempted by federal law).
128. See id. at 1182-83 (quoting CBA art. 51 § 12).
129. See id. at 1183 (citing Mitchell v. Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 635 S.E.2d
798, 804 (Ga. App. Ct. 2006)).
130. See id. at 1182 (“The NFL acknowledged in its pleadings before the district court that it performed these background checks as part of the CBA-man-
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the court found that determining whether the plaintiffs “reasonably
relied” on the alleged misrepresentations made by the NFL requires the court to interpret the language of the CBA, specifically
the exculpatory language of article 51, section 12.131 As such, the
court held that the plaintiffs’ claim of negligent misrepresentation
against the NFL was preempted by section 301 of the LMRA because determination of the claim would require the interpretation
of the CBA.132
For the same reasons as set forth above, the court then determined that section 301 preempted the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duties claims against the NFL and the NFLPA.133 In analyzing
the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court first needed
to determine whether a fiduciary duty existed.134 Under Georgia
law:
[A] fiduciary or confidential relationship arises where one
party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence
over the will, conduct, and interest or another where,
from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the law
requires the utmost good faith, such as the relationship
between partners, principal, and agent, etc. The party asserting the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship bears the burden of establishing its existence.
When a fiduciary or confidential relationship is not created by law or contract, we must examine the facts of a
particular case to determine if such a relationship
exists.135
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 80 Side A
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dated Career Planning Program. Thus, any duty the NFL owed Plaintiffs to
conduct these investigations with reasonable care arose directly from the CBA.”).
“[E]ach of these duties arose directly from the CBA’s mandate that both the NFL
and the NFLPA use ‘best efforts to establish the Career Planning Program.’ ” See
id. at 1183.
131. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1183 (“But here again the determination of
whether Plaintiffs reasonably relied on Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations is
substantially dependent on the CBA’s language . . . .”).
132. See id. (“Therefore, because the court would have to address the disclaimer language in the CBA in order to resolve the reasonable reliance element
of Plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claims, § [301] preempts these claims for
that reason as well.”).
133. See id. at 1184 (holding plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim to be
preempted by § 301).
134. See id. at 1183 (analyzing plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim).
135. See id. at 1183-84 (citing Savu v. SunTrust Bank, 668 S.E.2d 276, 282 (Ga.
App. Ct. 2008)).
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The court found that a fiduciary duty existed between the NFL,
the NFLPA, and the plaintiffs.136 However, the court found that
the fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiffs arose directly from the
CBA.137 Since the resolution of the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary
duty claim was dependent on interpreting the language of the CBA,
the claim was preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.138
Lastly, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that section
301 of the LMRA did not preempt their claims because some of the
plaintiffs were retired at the time of making their investments with
IMA.139 While some of the plaintiffs were retired at the time and
thus not part of the NFLPA’s bargaining unit, the court rejected
this argument.140 The court stated that, “[e]ven when retirees are
not part of the recognized bargaining unit and thus the union has
no continuing obligation to bargain on their behalf, the union and
employer can still choose to negotiate benefits for retirees.”141
Moreover, the court held that such an argument was invalid because, under section 301, retirees can enforce provisions in collective bargaining agreements that provide them with retirement
benefits.142 Therefore, since retired football players can potentially
receive benefits from the Career Planning Program, they were prevented from arguing that section 301 did not preempt their
claims.143 Thus, the court found that section 301 preempted all of
the claims that the plaintiffs brought against the NFL and the
NFLPA.144
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B. Casting Doubt on the Effectiveness of Exculpatory Language
in Collective Bargaining Agreements
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals both reached the same conclu-
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136. See id. at 1184 (determining whether fiduciary duty existed).
137. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1184 (“The fiduciary-duty claims supported by
[plaintiffs’] allegations directly arise from the [CBA] . . . .”).
138. See id. (“Further, resolution of these claims is substantially dependent on
the interpretation of the CBA’s language . . . .”).
139. See id. at 1184-85 (dismissing plaintiffs’ final argument).
140. See id. (concluding that plaintiffs’ status as retirees did not change § 301
analysis).
141. Id. (stating reasons why plaintiffs’ status as retirees did not change § 301
analysis).
142. See id. (explaining court’s reasoning).
143. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1184-85 (dismissing plaintiffs’ argument).
144. See id. (“For these reasons we uphold the district court’s determination
that § 301 preempts Plaintiffs’ state-law claim. We, therefore, affirm the district
court’s decision granting the NFL an NFLPA summary judgment on those
claims.”).
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sion that section 301 of the LMRA preempted the state law claims
that the plaintiffs brought against the NFL and the NFLPA.145 Similarly, both courts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.146 While both courts
ultimately reached the same result, the outcome of the case is not
nearly as important as the slightly different analyses that the courts
underwent in reaching their conclusions.147
The District Court held that section 301 of the LMRA preempted the state law claims against the NFL and the NFLPA.148
Furthermore, the District Court also found that even if section 301
did not preempt the plaintiffs’ claims, the exculpatory language of
article 51, section 12 of the CBA and the exculpatory language contained in the Financial Advisors Program, which both state that
players are solely responsible for their personal finances, would
have prevented the NFL and the NFLPA from liability.149 Thus, the
district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims using two different, independent legal theories.150
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
conclusion of the district court that summary judgment should be
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145. Compare id. at 1177-85 (holding plaintiffs’ claims preempted by § 301 because duties directly arose from CBA), with Atwater v. Nat’l Football League
Player’s Ass’n, No. 1:06-CV-1510-JEC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *4-5 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 26, 2009) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims based on two separate legal arguments); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26-27 (“This is important because
the district court provided independent grounds for defeating the plaintiffs’
causes of action against the NFL and NFLPA. . . . On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the ruling of the district court but with a modified rationale.”).
146. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1185 (granting defendants motion for summary
judgment); see also Atwater, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *43 (granting motion
for summary judgment to defendants); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at
26-27 (comparing Eleventh Circuit’s decision with district court’s decision in
Atwater).
147. See Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 27-28 (analyzing Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Atwater).
148. See Atwater, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *28 (“Even assuming that
plaintiffs’ claims did not arise directly from the CBA, they still would be preempted. As discussed above, § 301 preempts state law claims when the resolution
of those claims requires the interpretation of the CBA or any of its terms.”); see also
Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing district court’s holding).
149. See Atwater, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *29 (“In addition to being
preempted under § 301, plaintiffs’ claims against the NFLPA are barred by a disclaimer in the Financial Advisors Program Regulations.”); see also Lydakis & Zapata,
supra note 7, at 26 (stating that district court held that exculpatory language of
Financial Advisors Program prevented NFL and NFLPA from incurring liability).
150. See Atwater, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *28-29 (dismissing plaintiffs’
claims based on two separate legal theories); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7,
at 26 (noting district court’s holding).
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granted in favor of the defendants.151 Importantly, however, the
Eleventh Circuit provided different reasoning in granting summary
judgment to the defendants.152 In reaching its holding, the Eleventh Circuit focused solely on whether the claims of negligence,
negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty were preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.153
The analysis of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals appears
consistent with the precedent set by the Supreme Court in determining whether a plaintiff’s state law claim is partially or completely
preempted by section 301 when collective bargaining agreement
covers the terms of the plaintiff’s employment.154 The Atwater
Court first cited Lingle in setting up its analysis.155 As stated above,
in Lingle, the Supreme Court held that section 301 of the LMRA
completely preempts state law claims brought by a plaintiff when
the resolution of the claim involves interpreting the collective bargaining agreement governing the plaintiff’s employment.156 The
Atwater court held that the resolution of the plaintiffs’ three claims
brought against the defendants implicated the interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement.157 Relying on Rawson, the court
found that the duties underlying the plaintiffs’ claims in Atwater
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151. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1185 (affirming district court’s judgment); see also
Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26 (stating Eleventh Circuit’s holding).
152. See generally Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1177-1185 (holding that plaintiffs’ claims
were only preempted by § 301 and not that claims were dismissed based on exculpatory language); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 27 (“On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court but with a modified
rationale.”).
153. See generally Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1177-85 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims
based on § 301); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 27 (“The appeals court
upheld the district court’s determination that LMRA preempted plaintiffs’ statelaw claims; the panel did not reach the issue of whether the disclaimer contained
in the Financial Advisors Program regulations should have precluded Plaintiffs’
claims against it.”).
154. Compare Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1177-1185 (holding that § 301 preempted
plaintiffs’ state-law claims against NFLPA and NFL because legal duties imposed on
defendants arose from and required interpretation of CBA), with Lingle v. Norge
Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (holding state law claim for retaliatory discharge not preempted by § 301), and United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990) (holding § 301 preempts state law tort claims if duty
underlying tort claim is created by collective bargaining agreement); see also Castagnera, supra note 21, at 4 (“In my view, it is highly unlikely that the Eleventh
Circuit will grant a rehearing en banc and even less likely that the Supreme Court
will want to review the bilked players’ case. The preemption analysis simply seems
way too solid to require further consideration.”).
155. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1177 (citing Lingle).
156. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 (holding state law claim for retaliatory discharge not preempted by § 301).
157. See generally Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1177-1185 (deciding that legal duties underlying plaintiffs’ claims arose from CBA).
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arose from the CBA because the court held that the resolution of
the plaintiffs’ claims required interpretation of the CBA.158
As stated previously, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals focused solely on whether the claims of negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty were preempted by
section 301 of the LMRA.159 The Eleventh Circuit did not focus on
the exculpatory language of the CBA section creating the Career
Planning Program or the exculpatory language of the Financial Advisors Program.160 This is important because the District Court
held that even if section 301 of the LMRA did not preempt the
plaintiffs’ claims the exculpatory language meant that the claims
should be dismissed.161 Thus, the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims on independent legal grounds.162
However, the Appellate Court only referenced the exculpatory
language of the Career Planning Program in order to show that the
resolution of the claim would require interpretation of that language.163 Oddly enough, the court did not once refer to the seemingly more explicit exculpatory language of the Financial Advisors
Program regulations.164 Therefore, by limiting its analysis to the
preemptive effect of section 301 of the LMRA, the Atwater court cast
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158. See id. at 1180-81 (citing Rawson).
159. See generally Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1177-85 (holding that plaintiffs’ claims
were only preempted by § 301 and not that claims were dismissed based on exculpatory language); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 27 (“On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court but with a modified
rationale.”).
160. See generally Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1177-85 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims
based on § 301); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 27 (“The appeals court
upheld the district court’s determination that LMRA preempted plaintiffs’ statelaw claims; the panel did not reach the issue of whether the disclaimer contained
in the Financial Advisors Program regulations should have precluded Plaintiffs’
claims against it.”).
161. See Atwater v. Nat’l Football League Player’s Ass’n, No. 1:06-CV-1510-JEC,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *28-29 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 2009) (holding that
exculpatory language limited NFL and NFLPA from incurring liability even if
§ 301 did not); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 26-27 (“This is important
because the district court provided independent grounds for defeating the plaintiffs’ causes of action against the NFL and NFLPA . . . .”).
162. See Atwater, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98236, at *28-29 (dismissing plaintiffs’
claims based on two separate legal arguments); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra
note 7, at 26-27 (noting that district court dismissed complaints on two separate
legal theories).
163. See generally Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1177-85 (referencing exculpatory language but not analyzing its impact).
164. See generally Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1177-85 (holding § 301 preempted plaintiffs’ claims because legal duties underlying claim arose from CBA); see also Lydakis
& Zapata, supra note 7, at 27 (“Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit felt it was unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the exculpatory language of the Financial Advisor’s Program . . . .”).
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doubt on the applicability of exculpatory language in collective bargaining agreements between the NFL and the NFLPA.165 To a
lesser extent, the decision also casts doubt on the applicability of
exculpatory language in collective bargaining agreements as a
whole.166
By not discussing the effect of the exculpatory language, the
Eleventh Circuit missed a chance to clarify the effect of exculpatory
language in collective bargaining agreements.167 Consequently, the
Eleventh Circuit has effectively “muddied the water” on the applicability of exculpatory language in collective bargaining agreements.168 Additionally, the court’s decision to selectively refer to
the exculpatory language only in passing fails to take into account
the fact that the NFL and the NFLPA “freely assented to the terms
of the labor agreement.”169
V.

POTENTIAL IMPACTS

OF

ATWATER

By examining the changes the NFL made to the Financial Advisor’s Program and the results of the 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, one can clearly observe the immediate impact of
the Atwater litigation.170 Soon after the Eleventh Circuit decided
the Atwater case, the NFLPA suspended the Financial Advisors Program.171 The Financial Advisors Program remained closed until
August 2012 when the NFLPA finally reopened the investment program for former and present football players.172 Now that the Financial Advisors Program has been reopened, there are a number
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 82 Side B
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165. See Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 27 (“Atwater raises questions about
the effects of the CBA’s exculpatory language and the role of the federal courts in
adjudicating disputes lodged by players against the NFL and NFLPA.”).
166. See id. (discussing impact of Atwater on exculpatory language in collective
bargaining agreements).
167. See id. at 28 (“Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit has failed to concretely
establish the effect of the exculpatory language in the Career Planning Program
and the Financial Advisors Program.”).
168. See id. (noting that effect of exculpatory language in collective bargaining agreements is uncertain).
169. See id. (discussing impact of Atwater).
170. For a detailed discussion of the impact of the Atwater case, see infra notes
171-198 and accompanying text.
171. See Liz Mullen, NFLPA Reopens Adviser Program, SPORTS BUSINESS DAILY,
Aug. 6, 2012, at 7, available at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2012/08/06/Labor-and-Agents/NFLPA-advisers.aspx (stating that NFLPA Financial Advisors Program was reopened in 2012).
172. See id. (noting reopening of NFLPA Financial Advisors Program).
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of new rules and regulations for accepting financial advisors.173 For
example, the fee that the NFLPA charged prospective financial advisors to become certified under the Financial Advisors Program
has increased from $1,500 to $2,500 for the initial fee, and $500 to
$1,000 for the annual renewal fee.174 Tom DePaso, general counsel
for the NFLPA, attributes the increase in fees to the heightened
security and background checks that the NFLPA now uses to screen
prospective advisors.175
Other new rules that have been implemented include an increase in the years of licensed experience that advisors and brokers
are required to have, ranging from five years to eight years.176 Additionally, the NFLPA now requires advisors that become certified
under the Financial Advisors Program to have at least $4 million in
professional liability insurance; whereas in the past there was no
liability insurance requirement for advisors.177 Financial advisors
must also agree to indemnify the NFLPA against any lawsuit that a
player brings against them.178
As of August 2012, there are approximately 350 financial advisors that are certified by the NFLPA and about 750 more advisors
that have been placed on the waiting list to be certified under the
Financial Advisors Program.179 However, the new requirements enforced by the NFLPA might have the effect of decreasing the number of financial advisors that want to become NFLPA certified.180
The new Financial Advisors Program will be more costly to financial
advisors and will require advisors to file more paperwork, and at
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173. See id. (“The NFL Players Association has resumed accepting applications
for financial advisers to be certified in its program, under new rules that require
more experience and a more stringent background check.”).
174. See id. (listing some of new rules and fee increases for NFLPA Financial
Advisors Program). For a more detailed list of rules, regulations, qualifications,
and fees, see NFLPA Financial Advisor Registration Program Fact Sheet, NFLPA, available at http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/NFLPA%20Financial
%20Advisor%20-%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (noting increase in certification fee for potential financial advisors).
175. See Mullen, supra note 171 (quoting NFLPA general counsel Tom
DePaso).
176. See id. (listing new rules and regulations for Financial Advisors Program).
For a more comprehensive list of rules and regulations for the Financial Advisors
Program, see supra note 171 and accompanying text.
177. See Mullen, supra note 171 (reporting on new regulations for NFLPA Financial Advisors Program).
178. See id. (discussing Financial Advisors Program).
179. See id. (stating interest in being listed on NFLPA Financial Advisors
Program).
180. See id. (reporting on impacts of new rules and regulations of Financial
Advisors Program).
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least some advisors are not sure that the costs and the paperwork
are worth the hassle of being certified by the NFLPA.181 While the
Financial Advisors Program has changed as a result of Atwater, it is
not believed that the NFL’s retirement fund as a whole will be
changed.182
Another result of the litigation is that in the 2011 CBA between
the NFL and the NFLPA the exculpatory language of Article 51,
section 12 has been strengthened.183 The exculpatory language of
the Career Planning Program now states, “Neither the NFL, nor any
Club, nor the NFLPA shall be responsible for any investment decisions made by players; players and any advisors who they select will
bear sole responsibility for any investment or financial decisions
that are made.”184 While the exculpatory language has been emphasized to directly deflect any liability against the NFL and the
NFLPA as a result of failed investments under the Financial Advisor
Program, this change may have little actual effect on exculpating
the NFL or the NFLPA from future liability.185
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision not to discuss
the effect of the exculpatory language of the Career Planning Program, and the court’s decision not to mention the more explicit
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181. See id. (“One financial adviser now in the program, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said he is trying to decide whether to reapply under the new
guidelines. ‘It’s expensive,’ he said, ‘and it means more paperwork.’ ”).
182. See Zennie Abraham, NFLPA Hedge Fund Scandal, NFL BUSINESS NEWS
BLOG (July 11, 2006, 9:27 AM), http://nflbiz.blogspot.com/2006/07/nflpa-hedgefund-scandal.html (“Will this have impact on the NFL’s retirement fund? I don’t
think so. This was a program that some – not all – players participated in, so it
should have no impact at all on the total NFLPA retirement system.”).
183. Compare NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, art. LI § 12 (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 CBA] (“Neither the NFL, nor
any Club, nor the NFLPA shall be responsible for any investment decisions made
by players; players and any advisors who they select will bear sole responsibility for
any investment or financial decisions that are made.”), with 1993 CBA, supra note
2, at art. LV § 12 (“The program will also provide information to players on handling their personal finances, it being understood that players shall be solely responsible for their personal finances.”); see also Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at
28 (“The Atwater action was initiated under the amended 1993 CBA, several years
prior to the adoption of the 2011 CBA. Therefore it is likely no coincidence that
while the 1993 CBA merely stated that the parties ‘understood that players shall be
solely responsible for their personal finances,’ the 2011 CBA explicitly exculpates
the NFL, Clubs, and NFLPA from any investment decision made by players, and
further states that the players and their advisors bear ‘sole responsibility for any
investment or financial decisions that are made.’ ”).
184. 2011 CBA, supra note 183 (quoting art. 51 § 12 of 2011 CBA).
185. See Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 28 (“Unfortunately, the CBA parties’ attempt to address a pitfall in the 1993 CBA by bolstering the exculpatory
language of the 2011 Career Planning Program has at best been complicated by
the court of appeals, but at worst been negated altogether.”).
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exculpatory language of the Financial Advisors Program, casts
doubt on whether parties to a collective bargaining agreement can
limit their liability by including exculpatory language in the agreement.186 According to two scholars, “the CBA parties’ attempts to
address a pitfall in the 1993 CBA by bolstering the exculpatory language of the 2011 Career Planning Program has at best been complicated by the court of appeals, but, at worst, has been negated
altogether.”187 This certainly will not be the last litigation involving
professional football players, the NFLPA, and the NFL; however,
the role that exculpatory language will play in the resolution of any
future litigation between the parties remains uncertain.188
While the litigating parties in Atwater included retired sports
players, a sport labor union, and a professional sports league, it
should be noted that the case is relevant to other professions as
well.189 While discussing what employers should take away from
Atwater, Jonathan Spitz, a partner at Jackson Lewis stated, “[i]f [you
are] an employer and you insert yourself into the situation [by offering a list of financial advisers], you need to expect that people
are going to hold you accountable.”190 Thus, companies that offer
a list of financial advisors to their employees need to be especially
careful in the wake of Atwater.191 While employers are able to recommend any investment options they choose, they should stick to
recommending well-known, well-insured, and established investment options such as mutual funds.192
Furthermore, companies should be reminded of their fiduciary
obligations to their employees when providing a list of recommended investment options to them.193 While the breach of fiduci-
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186. See id. (discussing impact of Atwater holding).
187. Id. (analyzing impact of Atwater).
188. See generally id. (discussing effect of exculpatory clauses in collective bargaining agreements).
189. See Post, supra note 27 (commenting on Atwater litigation).
190. Id. (quoting Jonathan Spitz, partner at Jackson Lewis).
191. See id. (discussing impact of Atwater on employers).
192. See id. at 3 (“Employers can provide prudently chosen investment options, such as mutual fund groups, but doling out lists of hundreds of advisers from
assorted firms isn’t wise.”); see also id. (“Section 404(c) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security act outlines duties an employer must fulfill in order to transfer
investment-related liability to employees. ‘As part of compliance with 404(c), most
employers are providing information and options for places for employees to put
their money, but they’re sticking to the larger, well-established mutual fund companies and brokerage firms that are well-known, well-insured and well-financed
that may offer some opportunities for individually managing money’ . . . .”).
193. See id. (“ ‘This case is a reminder that plan fiduciaries have a general
obligation to provide participants with options and educational tools to make
smart decisions’ . . . .”).
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ary claim brought by the plaintiffs in Atwater was dismissed as
preempted by section 301 of the LMRA, the court never reached
the merits on the breach of fiduciary duty claim.194 Thus, Atwater
leaves some uncertainty as to whether exculpatory language in a
collective bargaining agreement is enough to insulate an employer
from breach of fiduciary duty when providing employees with possible investment options.195
While the aforementioned impacts of the Atwater litigation
paint a somewhat woeful picture for employers, not all employers
who engage in collective bargaining agreements should feel defeated.196 The Atwater court confirmed that any state law claims
that depend on the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement are preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.197 Therefore,
employers can take some comfort in the fact that “disgruntled
union members” will not be able to bring state law claims against
the employer as long as the claim depends on the interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the
labor union.198
Timothy L. Kianka*
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194. See Atwater v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170, 1184
(N.D. Ga. 2010) (concluding that breach of fiduciary duty claim brought by plaintiffs was preempted by § 301).
195. See Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 28 (discussing effect of exculpatory
language in collective bargaining agreements); see also Post, supra note 27 (noting
that employers that provide investment options to employees need to be extra
careful after Atwater).
196. See Castagnera, supra note 21, at 4 (“Those readers whose firms are in
collective bargaining relationships can take some comfort from the Atwater
decision.”).
197. See Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1177-85 (holding plaintiffs’ state-law claims for
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty preempted
by § 301); see also Castagnera, supra note 21, at 4 (discussing Atwater); see also
Lydakis & Zapata, supra note 7, at 27 (noting holding of Atwater); see also Post, supra
note 27 (reporting on impacts of Atwater).
198. See Castagnera, supra note 21, at 4 (“Employee benefits enshrined in collectively bargained agreements likely are insulated from state-law/state-court suits
brought by disgruntled union members.”).
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